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Chapter 2
Pension Coverage Initiatives:
Why Don't Workers Participate?
Richard P Hinz and John A. Turner
As the baby boom generation approaches retirement (the oldest will
receive their first Social Security checks in a decade), concern is being
raised that baby boomers are saving inadequately. Optimistic assessments
conclude that, at best, baby boomers are saving at the same rates as their
parents at an equivalent point in life.!
The private pension system provides a possible solution to the savings
problem. The system has already made a huge contribution to the in-
creasing affluence of the elderly, with income from employer-sponsored
pensions increasing from 14 percent of the income for the elderly (age
65 and older) in 1958 to 19 percent in 1992, and the proportion report-
ing some type of benefit increasing from 14 percent in 1962 to 47 percent
in 1992 (Chen 1992; Grad 1992). Whether additional retirement savings
provided through the private pension system is a reasonable hope is a
matter ofconsiderable conjecture.
The Supply of Private Pension Coverage
Despite its widely acclaimed success, the private pension system has its
own problems. Following the creation of substantial tax incentives in the
early part of the century and the emergence of organized labor as a
powerful advocate, the proportion of the workforce covered by employer-
sponsored pensions grew rapidly, increasing from 15 percent at the out-
set of World War II to 45 percent ofall private wage and salary workers in
1975, the year after comprehensive federal legislation, the Employment
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), was enacted. However, despite
the efforts of three Republican and two Democratic administrations,
twelve Congresses, three major recessions, the longest postwar expan-
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Figure 1. Private sector wage and salary workers by pension status. 1993. Source:
USDOL (1994) and authors' computations using April 1993 CPS and Form 5500
filings.
sion, and the most enduring bull market in history, there it has remained.
The result is the distribution of pension coverage shown in Figure 1.
Among the roughly 96 million private wage and salary earners compro-
mising the current workforce, nearly 51 million are not accruing benefits
on their currentjob.
The stability of the pension coverage rate, varying by no more than a
percentage point or two for more than twenty years, is remarkable. This
is especially so in light of the fundamental changes in the size and com-
position of the workforce that have accompanied the aging of the baby
boomers, the entry of women into the labor force, and the economic
uncertainties that last year made workplace security an issue in presiden-
tial election politics. It is also remarkable given the major changes in the
provision of pensions, with the decline in the percentage of the work-
force covered by a traditional defined benefit plan and the rapid growth
of 401 (k) plans.
While inadequate to describe the complexity of the forces at play in
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this stable (or stagnant) level of pension coverage, "standard economic
theory" has effectively defined the available "policy levers" to address the
perceived problem. It has essentially viewed the problem as a problem of
supply.
The standard assumption seems to be that there is an adequate level of
demand for pension coverage by most workers. This inevitably results in a
perspective that coverage expansions originate on the supply side, lead-
ing to a menu of alternatives that has become nearly exclusively oriented
to facilitating the ability of employers to sponsor plans. This tendency is
in no way reduced by the constant reminders from well-organized and
funded employer groups (interestingly enough almost exclusively com-
prised of those already sponsoring plans) about costs, regulatory bur-
dens, and their alleged effects on otherwise philanthropic tendencies
toward workers.
While simple in construct and thereby efficient in communication,
these implicit assumptions warrant scrutiny. The passage ofERISA would
appear to provide a considerable price shock on the supply side. Yet the
coverage rate remained unchanged.
Since then an alphabet soup ofTEFRAs, DEFRAs, TRAs, and REAs has
emanated from Congress. 2 While many of the legislative provisions were
motivated more by revenue raising than by an interest in pension cover-
age, many had the effect of imposing significant new costs on plan spon-
sors by either accelerating funding requirements or limiting the scope of
tax subsidies.
While the increase in employer costs has surely affected the reduction
in the number of small firms sponsoring defined benefit plans, the over-
all coverage rate remains essentially unaltered. The periodic Employee
Benefit Supplements to the Current Population Survey (CPS) yield a
coverage rate for full-time private wage and salary workers that has re-
mained at around 50 percent from 1972 to 1993.
At the broadest level, the available data on pension coverage provide
what appears to be compelling confirmation of the supply side presump-
tion. As Figure 2 shows, according to the April 1993 CPS supplement,
slightly more than 59 percent of the private wage and salary workforce
are employed in firms that offer pension coverage. One in five of those
not covered is ineligible for the plan provided by his or her current
employer. On the other hand, nine of ten workers in firms offering cover-
age report that they participate in the plan, resulting in a coverage rate of
about 45 percent of workers.
Looking at the factors associated with the employers of the covered
workers lends further credence to the second tenet of the conventional
wisdom, that the supply problem is one of small firms and is a result of
cost differences. Figure 3 shows what has perhaps become the most com-
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Figure 2. Pension plan sponsorship/participation categories, 1993. Source:
USDOL (1994) and authors' computations using April 1993 CPS Employee Bene-
fits Supplement.
monly cited statistic in the coverage debate, the relationship between
firm size and pension coverage. This shows that for the smallest firms,
those with fewer than 10 workers, the pension coverage rate is only about
one-seventh that of the larger firms. The simplest way in which this rela-
tionship is usually described is to note that, while more than 70 percent of
the workers in firms with more than 100 workers are earning pension
benefits, the rate is less than 25 percent for employers with fewer than
100 employees (the most commonly used definition of small business).
The source of this outcome is easy to identify in examining by firm size
intervals the proportion of workers whose employers do not offer a pen-
sion plan. While 86 percent of those working in firms that employ 10 or
fewer workers do not work for an employer that offers a plan, only 11
percent ofworkers in firms with more than 1,000 employees face a similar
limitation in access to the system.
A look at the relationship of administrative costs and size seems to
readily indicate the cause for this inequity. Analysis by Hustead (this
volume) of administrative expenses provides an estimate of the cost per
participant. The per capita administrative costs for the smallest firms are
Percent of Workers Covered by Plan
80%
73%
Figure 3. Pension coverage rates by firm size. 1993 (full-time private wage and salary workers). Source: USDOL (1994) and authors'
computations using April 1993 CPS.
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nearly eight times as great as those of the largest firms for defined contri-
bution plans.
This analysis, both simple in construct as well as conveniently confirm-
ing policyrnakers' intuitive notions and the complaints of their most vocal
critics, generally ends the diagnosis and dictates the prescriptions. Not
surprisingly, on the rare occasions when coverage expansion rather than
revenue enhancement has been a paramount concern, legislative ini-
tiatives have been guided by the desire to "level the playing field" for
small firms.
The Demand for Pension Coverage
However seductive in simplicity is the administrative cost explanation, a
closer look at the data belies the notion that the origins of the pension
coverage problem are so easily discerned. Stephen Long and Susan Mar-
quis, using 1988 CPS data, provide a framework so straightforward in
illuminating the limitations of the supply side analysis in the context of
employer-sponsored health benefits that it merits replication with the
1993 CPS for pension coverage (Long and Marquis 1994).
Workers in firms that do not offer pension benefits share some notable
characteristics. They are far more likely to be low-wage workers. More
than two-thirds of workers earning less than $10,000 per year are em-
ployed at firms with no pension plan. Similarly, they tend to be workers
with short tenure. While 59 percent of workers with less than one year on
the job are working in firms without a plan, fewer than one-quarter of
workers with more than ten years ofservice have no access to the pension
system through their own employer.
There is a considerable degree of interaction between earnings, ten-
ure, and firm size, Small firms tend to be less profitable and employ more
mobile and younger workers. They also tend to employ more part-time
workers. Age, tenure, and earnings are factors that define the demand
for pension benefits. Benefits from defined benefi t plans are of less value
for younger and shorter-tenure workers because of the lower proba-
bilities that they will vest and because of the back loading of benefit
accrual. Earnings provide a good proxy for the extent of the tax subsidy,
an equally if not more powerful determinant of demand for deferred
compensation.
An array of these variables permits inferences about whether the cover-
age issue is simply one of the distribution of opportunity or whether
there is an equally powerful element of demand at play, in which workers
with some group of attributes may be seeking employment at firms not
providing coverage, preferring instead cash wages.
Figure 4 shows worker tenure in relation to the pension participation
Percent of Workers With Short Tenure
100% I I
Figure 4. Sponsorship/participation categories by tenure, 1993. Source: USDOL (1994) and authors' computations using
April 1993 CPS Employee Benefits Supplement.
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status ofworkers in April 1993. The first column indicates the percentage
of workers whose employer offers a plan and who participate in it; the
second shows the percentage of workers who LUrn down an offer to par-
ticipate; the third, those who are ineligible; and the fourth column, the
proportion of those whose employer does not offer a pension plan. View-
ing the coverage from this perspective leads to two general conclusions.
The first supports the conventional wisdom. There are evidently a num-
ber of workers who are substantially "frozen out" of pension coverage
due to the terms of eligibility imposed by their employer. More broadly,
however, workers at firms that do not offer pension coverage share many
of the attributes of those who decline to be covered even when offered
the opportunity. This raises some question about whether workers would
elect coverage even if their employer could be induced to sponsor a plan.
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, pension coverage is determined
by a complex interaction of factors both on the supply and demand side,
with workers and firms sorting so that workers with low demand for
pension coverage tend to work in firms where the cost of providing pen-
sion coverage is relatively high. Small employers appear to be signifi-
cantly disadvantaged in their ability to offer coverage due to the eco-
nomics of scale. These same firms have a concentration of workers with
attributes that suggest a low demand for compensation in the form of
retirement benefits. We need look no further than the response to offers
of 401 (k) participation to confirm the latter. In 1993, only 65 percent of
workers in firms with a 401 (k) offering reported coverage. This is largely
driven by low-wage and younger workers' turndowns.
Uncovered Workers
The low coverage of employees at small firms may be due in part to
characteristics of those employees, such as low wages, that cause them to
have low demand. Because of their low wages, many employees working
for small employers may prefer wages to benefits.
To illuminate that issue, we examine characteristics of workers who are
offered pension coverage by their employer but turn it down. This situa-
tion arises in 401 (k) plans where employee contributions are required
for employee participation. Some workers turn down participation in
401 (k) plans but participate in a defined benefit plan offered by their
employer. Because those workers are covered, while our focus is on
workers not covered, we do not consider them.
Workers in firms that offer 401 (k) plans that turn down participa-
tion and do not participate in another plan offered by their employer
("401 (k) turndowns") tend to be younger than participants, to be fe-
male, and to have lower education, earnings, and tenure (Table 1). In
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TABU: I Characteristics of 401 (k) Plan Participants Compared with Other Workers
(all private wage and salary workers age 16 or older)
Characteristic All private
401(k) Allpension 401(k) sectarpension
turndoums nonparticipants participants participants
Medianage 31 33 39 40
Medianjob tenure 3 2 7 8
Median annual 18,200 13,700 31,400 27,300
earnings ($)
Percent female 51 49 40 41
Percent that work 84 65 93 92
full-time, full-year
Percent employed in 54 22 60 56
firms with 1,000+
workers
Sour",,: Authors' computations using the April 1993 CPS; N= 19,380.
those respects, the turndowns are more similar to other nonparticipants
than to 401 (k) participants.
While pension nonparticipants and 401 (k) turndowns are more simi-
lar to each other than to participants, pension nonparticipants have
lower tenure and earnings than the 401 (k) turndowns, and are less likely
to work full time, full year, less likely to work in a firm with 1,000 or more
employees, and less likely to have graduated from college. Because non-
participants are less likely that 401 (k) turndowns to have these charac-
teristics associated with coverage, many nonparticipants would probably
turn down coverage if their employer were to offer it.
While in most respects 401 (k) turndowns resemble other pension non-
participants, they are more similar to 401 (k) ~articipants in two respects:
they are more likely to work in large firms and are more likely to work full
time, full year. Firm size is an important determinant ofwhich firms offer
pension plans. Full-time, full-year status is an important determinant of
eligibility in firms that offer pensions.
Among 401 (k) turndowns and nonparticipants, particularly striking is
the low tenure of both groups. The median job tenure of turndowns is
three years, compared to two years for all pension nonparticipants and
eight years for pension participants.
We further examine the low coverage rate of low-tenure workers. For
each year increase injob tenure at low levels, the percentage of the labor
force covered by a pension plan ofany type, or by a 401 (k) plan, increases
(Table 2), The pension coverage rate rises from 9 percent for workers
with less than one year of tenure to 52 percent for workers with 5 years.
These statistics illustrate the correlation between high turnover jobs
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TABLE 2 Pension Coverage Status of Short-Tenure Workers (% of all private
wage and salary workers age 16 or older, except as indicated)
Job tenure (%)
Pension status <1 1 2 3 4 5
Covered 9 20 7 40 49 52
401 (K) covered 5 10 15 21 28 27
Offered 401 (k) but not 73 59 44 39 30 26
participating* (13) (14) (12) (13) (12) (10)
Employer does not offert 63 53 52 42 38 39
Source: Authors' computations using the April 1993 CPS; N ~ 11,497.
*Percentage ofall workers in parentheses.
'Includes "don't Imow."
TABLE 3 401 (k) Contributions for Low- and Middle-Income Workers
Contributing to 401 (k) Plans, 1993
Annual earnings
Under $10,000
$10,000-14,999
$15,000-19,999
$20,000-24,999
$25,000-29,999
$30,000-34,999
$35,000-39,999
$40,000-49,999
Mean cuntributions ($)
503
782
1,000
1,418
1,746
2,198
2,784
3,242
Source: Authors' computations nsing the April1993 CPS; N = 16,120.
Note: These figures represent employee contributions only.
and lack of pension coverage. This correlation indicates that defined
benefit plans would not appeal to many workers lacking pension cover-
age because they have high job turnover and would suffer portability
losses in a defined benefit plan, Thus, policies to expand coverage may be
more successful if they focus on defined contribution rather than de-
fined benefit plans.
The percentage of workers offered a 401 (k) plan that chooses not to
participate decreases sharply with tenure, from 73 percent with less than
one year tenure to 26 percent with 5 years tenure.
Andrea Kusko,James Poterba, and David Wilcox (this volume) provide
further evidence concerning 401 (k) turndown and eventual job tenure.
Using data from a single large firm, they find that the participation rate
among new hires was lower than among other workers: only about 50
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percent participated, versus 80 percent overall. The participation rate
among new hires in 1989 who left the firm in 1990 was only 6.5 percen t.
In sum, the typical characteristics of workers turning down 401 (k)
participation suggest that public policies designed to affect the supply
side of pension coverage (i.e., employer's costs) may have limited effect.
Even when employers offer pension coverage, workers with low tenure
and other characteristics typical of nonparticipants frequently choose
not to participate.
When low- and middle-income workers do participate in 401 (k) plans,
their contributions are generally low (Table 3). Low- and middle-income
workers generally contribute far below the maximum they are allowed to
contribute.
A Predicted Probability Analysis of Nonparticipants
To extend the analysis of nonparticipants, we estimate a logistic regres-
sion on pension coverage. Our concern is whether noncovered workers
would choose to be covered by a pension plan if their employer offered
one. To investigate this, we estimate a standard regression on the proba-
bility of participating in a pension plan. Because we are focusing on
worker demand for coverage, we used as explanatory variables gender,
age, race, education, work status (full versus part time), earnings, and
tenure. We then calculated individual prediction probabilities for all ob-
servations that appeared in the regressions, and we sorted them from low
to high probability separately for covered and noncovered workers.
There is little overlap between covered workers and noncovered work-
ers in terms of the predicted probability of coverage. Among noncovered
workers, those at the top quartile in probability of coverage have a 46
percent probability of being covered. By comparison, among covered
workers, those at the bottom quartile have a 48 percent probability of
being covered (Tables 4, 5).
From the predicted probabilities of coverage for noncovered workers,
it appears reasonably likely that 10 percent of noncovered workers would
participate if offered a pension. The top 10 percent of noncovered
workers have a predicted probability of coverage of at least 67 percent.
Conversely, discrimination rules may be expanding coverage among
workers who have a low probability of being covered but who work for
large firms. Among workers whose personal characteristics place them in
the bottom quartile of predicted probabilities of coverage but who are
covered, 50 percent work for firms with 1,000 or more employees.
Examining further the role of firm size in explaining low-probability
coverage and low-probability lack of coverage, covered workers in the
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TABLE 4 Predicted Probability That Workers Would Participate in a Pension if It
Were Offered, 1993
Percentile Covered workers Noncovered workers
10 .326 .038
25 .484 .106
50 .696 .251
75 .840 .461
90 .924 .672
Source: Authors' computations using the April 1993 CPS.
TABLE 5 Percentage ofWorkers by Quartile of Predicted Probability of Coverage,
Coverage Status, and Firm Size, 1993
Firm size
First quartile (%)
Yes No
Fourth quartile (%)
Yes No
Fewer than 25
25-249
250-999
1,000+
13.2
24.5
11.9
50.3
42.3
24.2
7.1
26.5
5.9
16.4
12.8
64.9
43.6
31.7
7.4
17.3
Source: Authors' computations using the April 1993 CPS.
lowest earning quartile are more than twice as likely to work for a firm
with more than 1,000 employees that are noncovered workers in the
highest earnings quartile (Table 6), In most other respects, noncovered
workers in the highest earnings quartile have characteristics that make
them more likely to be covered than do covered workers in the lowest
earnings quartile. These statistics suggest that some high-income workers
would be covered by a pension if they worked for an employer that of-
fered one, but are not because they are working for a smaller employer
that does not offer a plan.
All these statistics ultimately leave those charged with formulating pol-
icies for addressing what the Committee for Economic Development
(1995) recently proclaimed to be a "looming crisis" with four essential
insights. First, the conventional view ofcoverage gaps as a supply problem
originating in small firms explains part of what is happening, Second,
there is also a demand side problem, Third, there is a mismatch of some
workers with high-demand characteristics in low-supply firms. The fourth
point is the most vexing to the economists' attempts to explain labor
market and savings behavior, There are apparently many workers whose
behavior does not comport with rational optimizing models. Some work-
ers rationally do not seek coverage because social security benefits pro-
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TABLE 6 Characteristics ofWorkers in the Highest Earnings Quartile Who Do Not
Have Pension Coverage and Workers in the Lowest Quartile Who Do
Characteristic
Median age
Medianjob tenure
Median annual earnings ($)
Percent female
Percent who are full-time full-year
workers
Percent employed in firms with 1,000+
workers
Percent college graduates
Highest earnings
quartile-
nonparticipants
37
3
39,520
27
95
20
43
Lowest earnings
quartile-
participants
37
5
9,880
72
49
55
9
Source: Authors' computations using the April 1993 CPS; N ~ 1,889.
vide a high replacement rate for low-income workers, because pension
saving is illiquid and thus cannot be used as precautionary saving, or
because the life cycle model suggests that young workers will have low
savings. Pension coverage, however, is essentially a highly regimented
form ofsavings, and there is evidently a substantial part of the population
whose behavior may be predicted more on some deeper psychological
imperative than the current economic model incorporates.
What Is Wrong with the Traditional Economic Model?
The traditional economic model of pension coverage is based on the
supply and demand for pension coverage. The demand for pension cov-
erage is determined by workers' demand for retirement savings, which is
determined by the life cycle model of retirement savings.
The supply-demand model is usually extended to recognize that cover-
age at a firm is not en tirely an individual decision but is determined
by the collective demand of workers at the particular firm. Individual
workers who wish pension coverage may not be covered because they
work for a firm where other workers have a low demand for coverage.
Nondiscrimination rules require that most workers at a firm be covered if
any are covered. That point is seen when examining characteristics of
workers in the highest earning quartile without coverage and workers in
the lowest earnings quartile with coverage (Table 6).
The traditional supply-demand model for expanding pension cover-
age focuses on changes in prices. Policies based on this model focus
largely on the supply side - on reducing the cost of providing benefits.
If households act as the life cycle theory of saving predicts, absent the
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distorting effect of other government programs, public policy initia-
tives to encourage pension coverage would be unnecessary. Households
would save adequately for retirement, and there would be no need for
public policy to encourage retirement saving. However, transfer pro-
grams conditioned on lack of savings, such as college scholarship pro-
grams, discourage families from saving.
Further, while the life cycle model may predict the behavior of sophisti-
cated workers who save adequately for retirement based on its principles,
the life cycle model is unlikely to predict retirement savings for many
workers as Thaler (1994) argues. Figuring out how much to save and the
optimal savings path to take are difficult problems. With risk aversion by
households causing them to weight undersaving more heavily than over-
saving in utility calculations, it is not evident, however, that the difficulty
of determining the optimal amount to save leads to undersaving. The
preference of present over future consumption may cause households to
err on the side ofundersaving when they are uncertain as to how much to
save.
Also, given that people only save for retirement once, the opportu-
nities for learning by doing and correcting mistakes in subsequent repeti-
tions are minimal. This problem is mitigated to the extent that people
can adjust their hours worked, their savings rate, and their retirement
date as they approach retirement and are better able to judge the amount
of savings they need. However, many workers find that their labor market
opportunities become more limited as they approach retirement, which
decreases their flexibility in making adjustments.
The only plausible ways in which people might approximate an opti-
mal savings plan are by learning from others (role models or experts) or
by using good rules of thumb. Learning from the experience of others is
difficult because changes in social security and private pension benefits
make the experience of current retirees of limited value for current
workers. Simple rules ofthumb do not exist because the amount saved to
meet a target income replacement rate depends on the age at which the
savings program starts and the expected return and risk of the invest-
ment portfolio.
A further problem with the life cycle theory stems from the human fail-
ing of lack of self-control. Even if an individual could calculate the opti-
mal amount to save in order to maximize lifetime utility, he or she might
not resist the temptation of current consumption versus consumption 30
or more years hence. Rational discounting of future consumption by the
probability of being alive at a distant future date also reduces the incen-
tive to save. Insufficient self-control, however, may prevent households
from saving through pension plans when theory predicts they would.
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It is psychologically easier to save in some situations than others. In the
past, when defined benefit plans were more prevalent, workers did not
face a decision as to whether or how much to save through their pension
plan. Given that they worked for an employer offering a pension plan,
coverage and saving were automatic. Currently, with 401 (k) plans, more
burden is placed on the worker to determine how much retirement sav-
ing is needed.
Ippolito (this volume) provides an alternative explanation for why
workers do not participate in pension plans. He argues that some workers
have high discount rates. For them, the life cycle model does not work
because they heavily discount future periods. It seems that some workers
heavily discount the future because they place a low utility on future
events.
Reasons Workers Do Not Participate in Pension Plans
Critics ofthe life cycle model suggest that some workers do not participate
in pension plans because of psychological factors. Economic studies indi-
cate characteristics ofworkers who choose not to participate when offered
a pension plan, but do not tell us specifically the reasons why they choose
not to participate. A survey offederal government workers covered by the
Thrift Savings Plan in 1990 provides evidence on that issue. It asked why
workers choose not to contribute the plan (Table 7). In terms ofstandard
price theory, it is difficult to understand why workers who expect to vest
and who would receive dollar-for-dollar matching contributions would
not contribute. The matching contribution guarantees a high rate of
return on their contribution. The most common response, given by more
than a fourth ofmen (29 percent) not contributing and more than a third
of women (34 percent), was that they could not afford to contribute.
While for some that response may reflect a liquidity constraint, for others
it may reflect a lack ofself.-control in saving for retirement.
Factors other than income clearly are among the determinants of the
response that a workers is unable to contribute. Eighty-one percent of the
workers in the lowest income quartile do not give that response, while 7
percent ofthe workers in the highest quartile responded that they cannot
afford to contribute (Table 8).
A number of the reasons given in the survey for not participating do
not fit into the economic framework of financial reasons for nonpar-
ticipation. Nearly one in six men and women (16 percent) did not con-
tribute because they did not understand the Thrift Savings Plan, and
nearly as many (12 percent of men and 15 percent of women) did not
invest because they did not have enough information. A tenth (10 per-
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TABLE 7 Reasons for Not Contributing to the Federal Thrift Savings Plan
(percent of sample not contributing)
Reasonsfor not contributing
Can't spare the money
Prefer other investments
Too close to retiremen t
Don't understand the Thrift Savings Plan
Don't want money tied up
Don't have enough information
No confidence in the plan
Haven't considered the Thrift Savings Plan
Never got around to it
May not stay in federal government
Men
28.7
24.2
16.7
15.7
14.2
12.0
10.3
10.1
7.3
3.9
Women
34.2
19.7
13.1
16.0
14.2
14.5
5.8
9.6
13.7
3.8
SOUTce: Authors' computations from 1990 Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board
data: N = 1,042.
Note: Respondents could check all applicable reasons.
TABLE 8 Workers Responding They Cannot Afford to Contribute to the Thrift
Savings Plan, by Income Quartile
Qy.artile Male Female All
(1) $25,000 or less 17.1 21.0 19.4
(2) $25,000-$35,000 11.4 13.4 12.2
(3) $35,001-$55,000 12.6 4.8 10.0
(4) More than $55,000 3.8 10.1 6.5
All 11.9 14.7 13.1
SOUTce: Authors' computations from 1990 Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board
data.
cent) of both men and women not contributing did not contribute be-
cause they had not considered contributing to the plan. More than one-
eighth of the women (14 percent) but fewer men (7 percent) did not
invest because they had not bothered to do it. Thus, lack of knowledge
and inertia are important reasons why workers did not contribute.
A recent study provides further evidence that the complexity of the
problem of determining how much retirement income is necessary for
maintaining one's standard of living in retirement may cause some peo-
ple to save inadequate amounts. A Putnam Investments survey found that
almost two thirds ofAmericans said they were "notworried" about having
enough money to live on during retirement, despite not knowing how
much retirement income they will need (Putnam Investments 1995).
Supporting the evidence as to lack of knowledge about the amount of
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saving necessary for retirement, a survey by the Employee Benefit Re-
search Institute (EBRI) found that 70 percent of survey respondents did
not know how much they needed to save for retirement (Yakaboski 1995).
These reasons suggest that better participant education by plan sponsors
may increase pension coverage (Bernheim, this volume).
What Can Public Policy Do?
Legislative initiatives in recent years have reflected a growing (although
rarely explicit) recognition of both supply and demand elements of pen-
sion coverage. By 1990,legislation designed to expand pension coverage
had been sponsored by members of Congress from both parties, includ-
ing such luminaries as Senator Lloyd Bentson, then chairing the Senate
Finance Committee, and Representative Dan Rostenkowski, presiding
over the House Ways and Means Committee. Their efforts originated with
the concept of "pension simplification," whose lineage was readily trace-
able to the so-called "tax simplification" efforts of the mid 1980s. These
multipronged initiatives ultimately culminated in the passage ofH.R. II,
the Revenue Act of 1992, shortly before the presidential election.
That bill directly addressed two of the limitations to coverage outlined
above. It sought to expand the sponsorship ofdefined contribution plans
by easing perceived limitations for small employers. And by providing
simplified rules for nondiscrimination testing, it tried to address the
problem of the high-<:!emand worker in a firm with workers with a lower
propensity to participate in a pension plan.
These objectives were approached in two ways. The bill would have
expanded the availability of Salary Reduction Simplified Employee Plans
(SARSEPs, or essentially employer-organized lRAs with higher contribu-
tion limits) by permitting firms with up to 100 employees to sponsor the
plans. It would also have relaxed the nondiscrimination rules by allowing
contributions to these plans even if fewer than 50 percent of the spon-
sor's employees elected to contribute. It also would have provided two
alternative ways of satisfying the 401 (k) nondiscrimination rules: by per-
mitting sponsors (1) to match 100 percent of the first 3 percent of elec-
tive deferrals and 50 percent of employee contributions up to the first 5
percent of salary, or (2) to provide an employer contribution of3 percent
for each non-highly compensated participant.
Returning from Houston following his defeat by Bill Clinton, however,
President George Bush vetoed the bill on the basis of the tax increases it
also contained.
In June 1995, the Clinton administration announced its version of
pension simplification. That bill, however, met the same fate as its pre-
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decessor, its demise resulting from the fact that it was included in a
legislative package emerging from the new Republican majority's grand
plans to balance the budget by extracting unprecedented changes in the
structure and spending on entitlement programs, most notably Medi-
care. Much like President Bush before him, while apparently continuing
to support the objectives of the pension simplification measures, Presi-
dent Clinton vetoed the bill in late 1995.
The first two rounds of legislative failures, with similar bills passed by
Congresses dominated by both parties and vetoed by both a Republican
and Democratic president, demonstrated the capacity for consensus on
the issues, if not a practical resolution.
Despite this history, or more likely because of the continued popularity
of the approach, in early 1996 President Clinton announced an ex-
panded version of the earlier pension proposals, and in August 1996, he
signed the Small BusinessJob Protection Act. This act established a new
type of pension plan, the Savings Incentive Match Plan for Employees-
or SIMPLE. Employers with 100 or fewer employees earning $5,000 or
more in the previous year are eligible to establish this type of plan. A
SIMPLE pension is a salary reduction plan that allows employees to con-
tribute up to $6,000 of pretax pay per year (the amount to be indexed
for inflation in $500 increments). The employer must either (1) make a
100 percent matching contribution, not to exceed 3 percent of compen-
sation, or (2) make a 2 percent nonelective contribution to all eligi-
ble employees with $5,000 or more in compensation the preceding year.
For the nonelective contribution, there is a compensation ceiling of
$150,000. All contributions vest immediately. This plan is intended to
reduce the administrative and financial burden on small employers asso-
ciated with establishing and maintaining a pension plan.
Policy Impact
CPS data can be used to assess the likely increase in coverage that would
result from various policies. Policies that take a supply side approach
attempt to encourage small firms with relatively high costs to act more
like large firms with relatively low costs. An estimate of the maximum
effect of such policies, including the maximum effect of the SIMPLE
plan, can be obtained by assuming that workers in small firms are actually
in large firms. We recalculated the predicted probability of coverage for
small firm workers assuming they were employed in large firms, of more
than 1,000 workers. The predicted probability calculations were done by
removing the effects of variables whose estimated coefficients were statis-
tically insignificant at the 5 percent level. The predicted probability of
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participation for small firms (fewer than 100 workers) more than doubles
from 0.22 to 0.53. When this increase in probability is applied to the 1993
CPS weighted population of nonparticipating workers in small firms, an
increase in coverage of 9.7 million workers is predicted. Because this
estimate uses 1993 worker counts, it underestimates the likely effect of a
policy change occurring in a later year.
The second type of policy considered focuses on reducing or eliminat-
ing the requirements of nondiscrimination in small firms so that high-
demand workers in those firms could obtain coverage. The effect of such
a policy can be estimated by calculating the number of workers in small
firms who are not covered, but have a high predicted probability of
coverage. There are 6.2 million workers in firms of 249 workers or fewer
who are not covered with a predicted probability of coverage of 74 per-
cent or higher.
Third, there is the large group ofworkers in both small and large firms
who are predicted to be covered but are not. We estimate that there are
7.7 million workers in firms of all sizes with a predicted probability of
coverage of 80 percent or higher, who are not currently covered. This
figure provides an upper bound estimate on the number of workers who
are predicted to be covered on the basis of economic and demographic
variables but who are not covered, perhaps because of psychological rea-
sons or because of economic reasons not currently recognized in empiri-
cal models. Combining that figure with the figure for workers in small
firms who are not covered but probably would be if they were in large
firms involves some double counting, but provides an upper bound esti-
mate of 17.4 million additional workers who might be covered by pension
coverage initiatives.
Conclusion
More than 50 million Americans do not participate in a pension plan at
their current job. This is the result of a complex array of factors that
include lack of opportunity to participate in such plans, a low level of
demand for compensation in the form of pension benefits by many
workers, and limitations related to the composition of workers within
many firms. Recent years have seen a fairly narrow range of legislative
initiatives directed toward enhancing coverage, although these have in-
creasingly recognized the demand side of the coverage equation.
At best, we can expect legislative changes to extend coverage to a
quarter to a third of currently uncovered workers, with actual results
likely to be considerably lower. The apparent dynamics of pension cover-
age indicate that achieving greater results is likely to require efforts to
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address the psychological elements that limit workers' capacity or moti-
vation for saving to as great an extent as they are directed to by eco-
nomic considerations. In this respect, we have, as Winston Churchill said,
reached "not the beginning of the end, but rather the end of the begin-
ning" in our efforts to achieve universal coverage.
The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance and comments of
Daniel Beller, Susan Benner, David McCarthy, Phyllis Fernandez, and
William Ross. The paper represents the views of the authors and does not
represent the position oflhe U.S. Department ofLabor or oflhe Interna-
tional Labor Office.
Notes
I. The issues related to the debate over the savings of the baby boom genera-
tion are surveyed in Hinz and Turner (1994).
2. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Deficit Reduction Act of
1984, Tax Reform Act of 1986, and Retirement Equity Act of 1984.
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